This paper addresses two concerns with the state of the art in network revenue management with dependent demands. The first concern is that the basic attraction model (BAM), of which the multinomial logit (MNL) model is a special case, tends to overestimate demand recapture in practice. The second concern is that the choice based deterministic linear program, currently in use to derive heuristics for the stochastic network revenue management problem, has an exponential number of variables. We introduce a generalized attraction model (GAM) that allows for partial demand dependencies ranging from the BAM to the independent demand model (IDM). We also provide an axiomatic justification for the GAM and a method to estimate its parameters. As a choice model, the GAM is of practical interest because of its flexibility to adjust productspecific recapture. Our second contribution is a new formulation called the Sales Based Linear Program (SBLP) that works for the GAM. This formulation avoids the exponential number of variables in the earlier choice-based network RM approaches, and is essentially the same size as the well known LP formulation for the IDM. The SBLP should be of interest to revenue managers because it makes choice-based network RM problems tractable to solve. In addition, the SBLP formulation yields new insights into the assortment problem that arises when capacities are infinite. Together these two contributions move forward the state of the art for network revenue management under customer choice and competition.
Introduction
One of the leading areas of research in revenue management (RM) has been incorporating demand dependencies into forecasting and optimization models. Developing effective models for suppliers to estimate how consumer demand is redirected as the set of available products changes is critical that occurs when a customer's preferred choice is unavailable, and he selects to purchase a fare on a different flight instead of buying up to a higher fare on the same flight. Authors that have tried to estimate upsell and recapture effects include Andersson (1998) , Ja et al. (2001) , and Ratliff et al. (2008) . In markets in which there are multiple flight departures, recapture rates typically range between 15-55%; see Ja et al. (2001) . Other authors have dealt with the topic of demand estimation from historical sales and availability data. The most recent methods use maximum likelihood estimation techniques to estimate primary demands and market flight alternative selection probabilities (including both same-flight upsell and cross-flight recapture); for details, see Vulcano et al. (2012) , Meterelliyoz (2009) and Newman, Garrow, Ferguson and Jacobs (2010) .
Most of the optimization work in network revenue management with dependent demands is based on formulating and solving large scale linear programs that are then used as the basis to develop heuristics for the stochastic network revenue management (SNRM) problem; e.g. see Bront et al. (2009 ), Fiig et al. (2010 , , Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2010) , Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2008) , Liu and van Ryzin (2008) , and Zhang and Adelman (2009) . Note that preliminary versions of Fiig et al. (2010) were discussed as early as 2005, and the method is one of the earliest practical heuristics for incorporating dependent demands into SNRM optimization.
However, as described in section 5.4, the applicability of the approach requires severe assumptions and is restricted to certain special cases and fundamentally differs from the discrete choice models described in this paper.
Our paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is to discrete choice modeling and should be of interest both to people working on RM, as well as to others with an interest Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov: A General Choice Model and Network RM Optimization 4 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX in discrete choice modeling. The second contribution is the development of a tractable network optimization formulation for dependent demands under the aforementioned discrete choice model.
Our first contribution is a response to known limitations of the multinomial choice model (MNL) which is often used to handle demand dependencies. The MNL developed by McFadden (1974) is a random utility model based on independent Gumbel errors, and a special case of the basic attraction model (BAM) developed axiomatically by Luce (1959) . The BAM states that the demand for a product is the ratio of the attractiveness of the product divided by the sum of the attractiveness of the available products (including a no purchase alternative). This means that closing a product will result in spill, and a portion of the spill is recaptured by other available products in proportion to their attraction values. In practice, we have seen situations where the BAM overestimates or misallocates recapture probabilities. In a sense, one could say that the BAM tends to be too optimistic about recapture. In contrast, the independent demand model (IDM) assumes that all demand for a product is lost when the product is not available for sale. It is fair to say, therefore, that the IDM is too pessimistic about recapture as all demand spills to the no-purchase alternative.
To address these limitations, we develop a generalized attraction model (GAM) that is better at handling recapture than either the BAM or the IDM. In essence, the GAM adds flexibility in modeling spill and recapture by making the attractiveness of the no-purchase alternative a function of the products not offered. As we shall see, the GAM includes both the BAM and the IDM as special cases. We justify the GAM axiomatically by generalizing one of the Luce Axioms to better control for the portion of the demand that is recaptured by other products. We show that the GAM also arises as a limiting case of the nested logit (NL) model where the offerings within each nest are perfectly correlated. In its full generality, the GAM has about twice as many parameters than the BAM. However, a parsimonious version is also presented that has only one more parameter than the BAM.
We adapt and enhance the Expectation-Maximization algorithm (henceforth EM algorithm) developed by Vulcano et al. (2012) for the BAM to estimate the parameters for the GAM , with the estimates becoming better if the firm knows its market share when it offers all products. The Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov: A General Choice Model and Network RM Optimization Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX 5 estimation requires only data from the products offered by the firm and the corresponding selections made by customers.
Our second main contribution is the development of a new formulation for the network revenue management problem under the GAM. This formulation avoids the exponential number of variables in the Choice Based Linear Program (CBLP) that was designed originally for the BAM; see . In the CBLP, the exponential number of variables arises because a variable is needed to capture the amount of time each subset of products is offered during the sales horizon. The number of products itself is usually very large; for example, in airlines, it is the number of origin-destination fares (ODFs), and the number of subsets is two raised to the number of ODFs for each market segment. This forces the use of column generation in the CBLP and makes resolving frequently or solving for randomly generated demands impractical. We propose an alternative formulation called the sales based linear program (SBLP), which we show is equivalent to the CBLP not only under the BAM but also under the GAM. Due to a unique combination of demand balancing and scaling constraints, the new formulation, has a linear rather than exponential number of variables and constraints. This provides important practical advantages because the SBLP allows for direct solution without the need for large-scale column generation techniques. We also show how to recover the solution to the CBLP from the SBLP. We show, moreover, that the solution to the SBLP is a nested collection of offered sets together with the optimal proportion of time to offer each set. The smallest of these subsets is the core, consisting of products that are always offered.
Larger subsets typically contain lower-revenue products that are only offered part of the time.
Offering these subsets from the largest to the smallest in the suggested portions of the time over the sales horizon provides a heuristic to the stochastic version of the problem. Moreover, the ease with which we can compute the optimal offered sets from the SBLP formulation allow us to resolve the problem frequently and update the offer sets. In addition, other heuristics proposed by the research community, e.g., Bront et al. (2009) , Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2010) , Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2008) , Liu and van Ryzin (2008) , Talluri (2012) , and Zhang and Adelman (2009) , can benefit from the ability to quickly solve large scale versions of the CBLP and SBLP formulations. The solution to the SBLP also provides managerial insights into the assortment problem (a special case that arises when capacities are infinite).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2 we present the GAM as well as two justifications for the model. We then present an expectation-maximization (E-M) algorithm to estimate its parameters. In §3 we present the stochastic, choice based, network revenue management problem. The choice based linear program is reviewed in section §4. The new, sales based linear program is presented in §5 as well as examples that illustrate the use of the formulation. The infinite capacity case gives rise to the assortment problem and is studied in §6.
Our conclusions and directions for future research are in §7.
Generalized Attraction Model
For several decades, most revenue management systems operated under the simplest type of customer choice process known as the independent demand model (IDM). Under the IDM, demand for any given product is independent of the availability of other products being offered. So if a vendor is out-of-stock for a particular product (or it is otherwise unavailable for sale), then that demand is simply lost (to the no-purchase alternative); there is no possibility of the vendor recapturing any of those sales to alternate products because the demands are treated as independent. Many practitioners recognized that ignoring such demand interactions lacked realism, but efforts to incorporate upsell heuristics into RM optimization processes were hampered by practical difficulties in estimating upsell rates. It was widely feared that, without a rigorous foundation for estimating upsell, the use of such heuristics could lead to an overprotection bias in the inventory controls (and consequent revenue losses). By the late 1990's, progress on dependent demand estimation methods began to be made. van Ryzin, Talluri and Mahajan (1999) presented excellent arguments for the integration of discrete choice models into RM optimization processes, and initial efforts to apply this approach focused on the multinomial logit model (MNL) which is a special case of the basic attraction model (BAM) discussed next.
Under the BAM, the probability that a customer selects product j ∈ S when set S ⊂ N = {1, . . . , n} is offered, is given by
where V (S) = j∈S v j . The v j values are measures of the attractiveness of the different choices, embodied in the MNL model as exponentiated utilities (v j = e ρu j for utilities u j where ρ > 0 is a parameter that is inversely related to the variance of the Gumbel distribution). The no-purchase alternative is denoted by j = 0, and π 0 (S) is the probability that a customer will prefer not to purchase when the offer set is S. One could more formally write π j (S + ) instead of π j (S) since the customer is really selecting from S + . However, we will refrain from this formalism and follow the convention of writing π j (S) to mean π j (S + ). Also, unless otherwise stated, S ⊂ N and the probabilities π j (S) refer to a particular vendor. In discrete choice models, a single vendor is often implicitly implied. However, in some of our discussions below, we will allow for multiple vendors.
In the case of multiple vendors, the probabilities π j (S) j ∈ S, will depend on the offerings of other vendors.
There is considerable empirical evidence that the BAM may be optimistic in estimating recapture probabilities. The BAM assumes that even if a customer prefers j / ∈ S + , he must select among k ∈ S + . This ignores the possibility that the customer may look for products j / ∈ S + elsewhere or at a later time. As an example, suppose that a customer prefers a certain wine, and the store does not have it. The customer may then either buy one of the wines in the store, leave without purchasing, or go to another store and look for the wine he wants. The BAM precludes the last possibility; it implicitly assumes that the search cost for an alternative source of product j / ∈ S + is infinity.
We will propose a generalization of the BAM , called the General Attraction Model (GAM) to better deal with the consequences of not offering a product. Before presenting a formal definition of the GAM, we will present a simple example and will revisit the red-bus, blue-bus paradox (BenAkiva and Lerman (1994) ). Suppose there are two products with attraction values v 1 = v 2 = v 0 = 1.
Under the BAM, π k ({1, 2}) = 1/3 for k = 0, 1, 2. Eliminating choice 2 results in π k ({1}) = 50% for Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX k = 0, 1, so one half of the demand for product 2 is recaptured by product 1. Suppose, however, that product 2 is available across town and that the customer's attraction for product 2 from the alternative source is w 2 = 0.5. Then his choice set, when product 2 is not offered, is in reality S = {1, 2 } with 2 representing product 2 in the alternative location with shadow attraction w 2 .
A customer can now select between the no-purchase alternative (v 0 = 1), product 1 (v 1 = 1), and product 2' (w 2 = 0.5), so the probabilities of purchase from the store offering only product 1 are now π 0 ({1}) = 1.5 2.5 = 60%, π 1 ({1}) = 1 2.5 = 40%.
By including 2' as a latent alternative, the probability of choosing product 1 has decreased from 50% under the BAM to 40%. However, this probability is still higher than that of the independent demand model (IDM) which is 33.3%. So the GAM allows us to obtain estimates that are in-between the BAM and the IDM by considering product specific shadow attractions. This formulation may also help with inter-temporal choices, where a choice j / ∈ S + may become available at a later time.
In this case w j is the shadow attraction of choice j discounted by time and the risk that it may not be available in the future. Notice that this formulation is different from what results if we use the traditional approach of viewing a product and location as a bundle. Indeed, including product 2' with attraction w 2 = 0.5, results in choice set {1, 2, 2 } for the customer when the vendor offers assortment {1, 2}. This results in π 1 ({1, 2, 2 }) = 1/3.5 = 1/3. The problem with this approach, in terms of the MNL, is that an independent Gumbel random variable is drawn to determine the random utility of product 2'.
Under the red-bus, blue-bus paradox, a person has a choice between driving a car and taking either a red or blue bus (it is implicitly assumed that both buses have ample capacity and depart at the same time). Let v 1 represent the direct attractiveness of driving a car and let v 2 , w 2 represent, respectively, the attraction and the shadow attraction of the two buses. If w 2 = v 2 then the probabilities are unchanged if one of the buses is removed (as one intuitively expects because there are essentially zero search costs in finding a comparable bus). The model with w 2 = 0 represents the case where there is no second bus. The common way to deal with the paradox is to use a nested logit (NL) model. Under the NL model used to resolve the paradox, a person first selects a mode of transportation and then one of the offerings within each mode. We are able to avoid the use of the NL model, but as we shall see later, our model can be viewed as a limit of a NL model.
To formally define the GAM letS = {j ∈ N : j / ∈ S} be the complement of S in N = {1, . . . , n}.
In addition to the attraction values v j , there are shadow attraction values
where for any R ⊂ N , W (R) = j∈R w j . Consequently, the no-purchase probability is given by
. In essence, the attraction value of the no-purchase alternative has been modified to be v 0 + W (S).
An alternative, perhaps simpler, way of presenting the GAM by using the following transforma-
With this notation the GAM becomes:
where π S (S) = j∈S π j (S). Notice that all choice probabilities are non-negative as long asṽ j =
The case w k = 0, k ∈ N recovers the BAM, becauseṽ 0 = v 0 andṽ j = v j , j ∈ N . In contrast, the
for all offered sets S ⊂ N . The probability π j (S), of selecting product j is independent of the set S containing j, resulting in the independent demand model (IDM).
The parsimonious formulation P-GAM is given by w j = θv j ∀j ∈ N for θ ∈ [0, 1] can serve to test H 0 : θ = 0 vs H 1 : θ > 0 to see whether the BAM applies or to test H 0 : θ = 1 against H 1 : θ < 1, to see whether the IDM applies. If either of these tests fail, then a GAM maybe a better fit to the data.
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We provide two justifications for the GAM. The first justification is Axiomatic. The second is a limiting case of the nested logit (NL) model. Readers who are not interested in the formal derivation of the GAM can skip to section 2.4 for a method to estimate the GAM parameters.
Axiomatic Justification
Luce (1959) proposed two choice axioms. To describe the axioms under the assumption that the no-purchase alternative is always available we will use the notation π S + (T ) = j∈S + π j (T ) for all S ⊂ T and will use set difference notation T − S = T ∩S to represent the elements of T that are not in S. The Luce axioms are given by :
• Axiom 2: If π i ({i}) = 0 for some i ∈ T , then for any S ⊂ T such that i ∈ S π S (T ) = π S−{i} (T − {i}).
The most celebrated consequence of the Luce Axioms, due to Luce (1959) , is that π i (S) satisfies the Luce Axioms if and only if there exist attraction values v j , j ∈ N + such that equation (1) holds.
Since its original publication, the paper Luce (1959) has been cited thousands of times. Among the most famous citations, we find the already mentioned paper by McFadden (1974) that shows that the only random utility model that is consistent with the BAM is the one with independent Gumbel errors. An early paper by Debreu (1960) , criticizes the Luce model as it suffers from the so called independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA states the relative preference between two alternatives does not change as additional alternatives are added to the choice set. Debreu, however, suggests that the addition of an alternative to an offered set hurts alternatives that are similar to the added alternative more than those that are dissimilar to it. To illustrate this, Debreu provides an example that is a precursor to the red-bus, blue-bus paradox based on the choice between three records: a suite by Debussy, and two different recordings of the same Beethoven Tversky (1972) , criticizes both the Luce model as well as all random utility models that assume independent utilities for their inability to deal with the IIA.
Tversky offers the elimination by aspects theory as a way to cope with the IIA. Others, such as n Domenich and McFadden (1975) and Williams (1977) , have turned to the nested logit (NL) model as an alternative way of dealing with the IIA. Under a nested logit model, for example, a person will first chose between modes of transportation (car or bus) before selecting a particular car or bus color.
To our knowledge no one has altered the Luce Axioms with the explicit goal of modifying the recapture probabilities. Yellott (1977) , however, gives a characterization of the Luce model by an axiom which he called invariance under uniform expansion of the choice set, which is weaker than Luce's Axiom but implies Luce's Axiom when the choice model is assumed to be an independent random utility model. The reader is also refereed to Dagsvik (1983) , who expands Yellott's ideas to choices made over time.
Notice that Axiom 1 holds trivially for R = ∅ since π ∅ (S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N . For ∅ = R ⊂ S the formula can be written as the ratio of the demand captured by R when we add T − S to S. The ratio is given by
and is independent of R ⊂ S. Our goal is to generalize Axiom 1 so that the ratio remains independent of R ⊂ S but in such a way that we have more control over the proportion of the demand that goes to T − S. This suggests the following generalization of Axiom 1.
• Axiom 1': If π i ({i}) ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ T , then for any
for some set of values θ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ N .
We will call the set of Axioms 1' and 2 the Generalized Luce Axioms (GLA). We can think of θ j ∈ [0, 1] as a relative measure of the competitiveness of product j in the market place. The next 
A proof of this theorem may be found in the Appendix. Notice that it is tempting to relax the constraint w j ≥ 0 as long asṽ 0 > 0. However, this relaxation would lead to a violation of Axiom 2.
GAM as Limit of Nested Logit Model under Competition
We now show that the GAM also arises as the limit of the nested logit (NL) model. The NL model was originally proposed in Domenich and McFadden (1975) , and later refined in McFadden (1978) ,
where it is shown that it belongs to the class of Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) family of models.
Under the nested choice model, customers first select a nest and then an offering within the nest.
The nests may correspond to product categories and the offerings within a nest may correspond to different variants of the product category. As an example, the product categories may be the different modes of transportation (car vs. bus) and the variants may be the different alternatives for each mode of transportation (e.g., the blue and the red buses). As an alternative, a product category may consist of a single product, and the variants may be different offerings of the same product by different vendors. We are interested in the case where the random utility of the different variants of a product category are highly correlated. The NL model, allows for correlations for variants in nest i through the dissimilarity parameter γ i . Indeed, if ρ i is the correlation between the random utilities of nest i offerings, then γ i = √ 1 − ρ i is the dissimilarity parameter for the nest.
The case γ i = 1 corresponds to uncorrelated products, and to a BAM. The MNL is the special case where the idiosyncratic part of the utilities are independent and identically distributed Gumbel random variables.
Consider now a NL model where the nests correspond to individual products offered in the market. Customers first select a product, and then one of the vendors offering the selected product.
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Let O k be the set of vendors offering product k, S l be the set of products offered by vendor l, and v kl be the attraction value of product k offered by vendor l. Under the NL model, the probability that a customer selects product i ∈ S j is given by
where the first term is the probability that product i is selected and the second term the probability that vendor j is selected. Many authors, e.g., Greene (1984) , use what is know as the non-normalized nested models where v ij 's are not raised to the power 1/γ i . This is sometimes done for convenience by simply redefining
. There is no danger in using this transformation as long as the γ's are fixed. However, the normalized model presented here is consistent with random utility models, see Train (2002), and we use the explicit formulation because we will be taking limits as the γ's go to zero.
It is easy to see that π i (S j ) is a BAM for each vendor j, when γ i = 1 for all i. This case can be viewed as a random utility model, where an independent Gumbel random variable is associated with each product and each vendor. Consider now the case where γ i ↓ 0 for all i. At γ i = 0, the random utilities of the different offerings of product i are perfectly and positively correlated. This makes sense when the products are identical and price and location are the only things differentiating vendors. When these differences are captured by the deterministic part of the utility, then a single Gumbel random variable is associated with each product. In the limit, customers select among available products and then buy from the most attractive vendor. If several vendors offer the same attraction value, then customers select randomly among such vendors. The next result shows that a GAM arises for each vendor, as γ i ↓ 0 for all i.
Theorem 2. The limit of (4) as γ i ↓ 0 for all i is a GAM. More precisely, there are attraction values a kj ,ã kj ∈ [0, a kj ], andã 0j ≥ 0, such that the discrete choice model for vendor j is given by
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX This shows that if customers first select the product and then the vendor, then the NL choice model becomes a GAM for each vendor as the dissimilarity parameters are driven down to zero.
The proof of this result is in the Appendix. Theorem 2 justifies using a GAM when some or all of the products offered by a vendor are also offered by other vendors, and customers have a good idea of the price and convenience of buying from different vendors. The model may also be a reasonable approximation when products in a nest are close substitutes, e.g., when the correlations are high but not equal to one. Although we have cast the justification as a model that arises from external competition, the GAM also arises as the limit of a NL model where a firm has multiple versions of products in a nest. At the limit, customers select the product with the highest attraction within each nest. Removing the product with the highest attraction from a nest shifts part of the demand to the product with the second highest attraction , and part to the no-purchase alternative.
Consequently a GAM of this form can be used in Revenue Management to model buy up behavior when there are no fences, and customers either buy the lowest available fare for each product or do not purchase.
Limitation and Heuristic Uses of the GAM
One limitation of the GAM as we propose it is that, in practice, the attraction and shadow attraction values may depend on a set of covariates that may be customer or product specific. This can be dealt with either by assuming a latent class model on the population of customers or by assuming a customer specific random set of coefficients to capture the impact of the covariates. This results in a mixture of GAMs. The issues also arise when using the BAM. In practice, often a single BAM is used to try to capture the choice probabilities of customers that may come from different market segments. This stretches both models, as this should really be handled by adding market segments.
However the GAM can cope much better with this situation as the following example illustrates.
Example 1: Suppose there are two stores (denoted l), and each store attracts half of the population. We will assume that there are two products (denoted k) and that the GAM parameters v lk and w lk for the two stores are as given in Table 1 :
w 11 w 12 w 21 w 22 1 1 1 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 Table 1 Attraction Values (v, w) With this type of information we can use the GAM to compute choice probabilities π j (S) that a customer will purchase product j ∈ S from Store 1 when Store 1 offers set S, and Store 2 offers set R = {1, 2}. Suppose Store 1 has observed selection probabilities for different offer sets S as provided in Table 2 : Table 2 Observed πj(S, R) for R = {1, 2}
To estimate these choice probabilities using a single market GAM we found the values of Table 2 . However, when limited to the BAM, the largest error is 1.97% in estimating π 0 ({1, 2}).
This improved ability to fit the data comes at a cost because the GAM requires estimating w in addition to v. As we will see in the next section, it is possible to estimate the v and w from the store's offer sets and sales data. We will assume, as in any estimation of discrete choice modeling, that the same choice model prevails over the collected data set. If this is not the case, then the estimation should be done over a subset of the data where this assumption holds. As such, we do not require information about what the competitors are offering, only that their offer sets do not vary over the data set. This is an implicit assumption made when estimating any discrete choice model. The output of the estimation provides the store manager an indication of which products face more competition by looking at the resulting estimates of the ratios θ i = w i /v i . Over time, 
GAM Estimation and Examples
It is possible to estimate the parameters of the GAM by refining and extending the Expectation Maximization method developed by VvRR (Vulcano et al. (2012) ) for the BAM. Readers not interested in estimation can skip to Section 3. We assume that demands in periods t = 1, . . . , T arise from a GAM with parameters v and w and arrival rates λ t = λ for t = 1, . . . , T . The homogeneity of the arrival rates is not crucial. In fact the method described here can be extended to the case where the arrival rates are governed by co-variates such as the day of the week, seasonality index, and indicator variables of demand drivers such as conferences, concerts or other events that can influence demand. Our main purpose here is show that it is possible to estimate demands fairly accurately. The data are given by the offer sets S t ⊂ N and the realized sales z t ⊂ Z n + , excluding the unobserved value of the customers who chose the no-purchase alternative, for t = 1, . . . , T . VvRR assume that the market share s = π N (N ), when all products are offered, is known. While we do not make this assumption here, we do present results with and without knowledge of s.
VvRR update estimates of v by estimating demands for each of the products in N when some of them are not offered. To see how this is done, consider a generic period with offer set S ⊂ N, S = N and realized sales vector Z = z. Let X j be the demand for product j if set N instead of S was offered. We will estimate X j conditioned on Z = z. Consider first the case j / ∈ S. Since X j is
Poisson with parameter λπ j (N ), substituting the MLE estimateλ = e z/π S (S) of λ we obtain the
e z. We could use a similar estimate for products j ∈ S but this would disregard the information z j . For example, if z j = 0 then we know that the realization of X j was zero as customers had product j available for sale. We can think of X j , conditioned on (S, z) as a binomial random variable with parameters z j and probability of selection π j (N )/π j (S). In other words, each of the z j customers that selected j when S was available, would have selected j anyway with probability
z j is just the expectation of the binomial. Notice
π N (N ) =λs. We can findX 0 by treating it as j / ∈ S resulting in
e z =λ(1 − s). We summarize the results in the following proposition:
If j / ∈ S or j = 0 we haveX
VvRR use the formulas for the BAM to estimate the parameters λ, v 1 , . . . , v n under the assumption that the share s = v(N )/(1 + v(N )) is known. From this they use an E-M method to iterate between estimating theX j s given a vector v and then optimizing the likelihood function over v given the observations. The MLE has a closed form solution so the updates are given byv j =X j /X 0 for all j ∈ N , whereX 0 = rX[1, n] and r = 1/s − 1. VvRR use results in Wu (1983) to show that the method converges. We now propose a refinement of the VvRR method that can significantly reduce the estimation errors.
Using data (S t , z t ), t = 1 . . . , T , VvRR obtain estimatesX tj that are then averaged over the T observations for each j. In effect, this amounts to pooling estimators from the different sets by giving each period the same weight. When pooling estimators it is convenient to take into account the variance of the estimators and give more weight to sets with smaller variance. Indeed, if we have T different unbiased estimators of the same unknown parameter, each with variance σ 2 t , then giving weights proportional to the inverse of the variance minimizes the variance of the pooled estimator. Notice that the variance ofX tj is proportional to 1/π j (S t ) if j ∈ S t and proportional to 1/π S t (S t ) otherwise. Let a tj = π j (S t ) if j ∈ S t and a tj = π S t (S t ) if j / ∈ S t . We can select the set the weights for product j as
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Our numerical experiments suggests that using this weighting scheme reduces the variance of the estimators by about 4%.
To extend the procedure to the GAM we combine ideas of the EM method based on MLEs and least squares (LS). It is also possible to refine the estimates by using iterative re-weighted least squares (Green (1984) and Rubin (1983) ) but our computational experience shows that there is little benefit from doing this. To initialize the estimation we use formulas for the expected sales under S t , t = 1, . . . , T for arbitrary parameters λ, v and w. More precisely, we estimate E[Z tj ] by
We then minimize the sum of squared errors between estimated and observed sales (z t s):
subject to the constraints 0 ≤ w ≤ v and λ ≥ 0. This is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood function ignoring the unobserved values of the no-purchase alternative z t0 .
This gives us an initial estimate λ (0) , v (0) , w (0) and an initial estimate of the market share
If s is known then we add the constraint v(N ) = r = 1/s − 1. Given estimates of v (k) and w (k) the procedure works as follows: E-step: Estimate the first choice demandsX (k) tj and then aggregate over time using the current estimate of the weights α
M-step: Feed v (k+1) together with arbitrary λ and w to estimate sales under S t , t = 1, . . . , T and minimize the sum of squared errors between observed and expected sales over λ and w subject to w ≤ v (k+1) and non-negativity constraint to obtain updates λ (k+1) , w (k+1) and s (k+1) .
The proof of convergence is a combination of the arguments in Wu, as in VvRR, and the fact that the least squared errors problem is a convex minimization problem. The case when s is known 
where A i is the set of periods where product i is offered and
This is a system of up to 2n + 1 equations on 2n + 1 unknowns. Attempting to solve the score equations directly or through re-weighted least squares does not materially improve the estimates relative to the least square procedure described above.
We now present three examples to illustrate how the procedure works in three different cases:
1) w = 0 corresponding to the BAM, 2) w = θv corresponding to the (parsimonious) p-GAM, and 3) 0 = w ≤ v corresponding to the GAM. These examples are based on Example 1 in VvRR. The examples involve five products and 15 periods where the set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} was offered in four periods, set {2, 3, 4, 5} was offered in two periods, while sets {3, 4, 5}, {4, 5} and {5} were each offered in three periods. Notice that product 5 is always offered making it impossible to estimate w 5 . On the other hand, estimates of w 5 would not be needed unless the firm planned to not offer product 5.
In their paper, VvRR present the estimation results for a specific realization of sales z t , t = 1, . . . , T = 15 corresponding to the 15 offer sets S t , t = 1, . . . , 15. We instead generate 500 simulated instances of sales, each over 15 periods, and then compute our estimates for each of the 500 simulations. We report the mean and standard deviation of λ, v and either θ or w over the 500 Gallego, Ratliff, and XX simulations. We feel these summary statistics are more indicative of the ability of the method to estimate the parameters. We report results when s (historical market share) is assumed to be known, as in Vulcano et al. (2012) , and some results for the case when s is unknown (see 1. in the endnotes).
Estimates of the model parameters tend to be quite accurate when s is known and the estimation of λ and v become more accurate when w = 0. The results for s unknown tend to be accurate when Table 3 . The MSE and the M-MSE were respectively 247.50 and 58.44, for both the case of s known and unknown.
Example 3 (P-GAM) For this example v is the same as above but w = θv with θ = 0.20. The results are given in The results are given in Table 5 . 
Stochastic Revenue Management over a Network
In this section we present the formulation for the stochastic revenue management over a network.
We will assume that there are L customer market segments and that customers in a particular market segment are interested in a specific set of itineraries and fares (see 2. in the endnotes) from a set of origins to one or more destinations. For example, a market segment could be morning flights from New York to San Francisco that are less than $500, or all flights from New York City to the Mexican Caribbean. Notice that there may be multiple fares with different restrictions associated with each itinerary. At any time the set of origin-destination-fares (ODFs) offered for
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX sale to market segment l is a subset S l ⊂ N l , l ∈ L = {1, . . . , L} where N l is the consideration set for market segment l ∈ L with associated fares p lk , for each product k in nest N l . If the consideration sets are non-overlapping over the market segments then there is no need to add further restrictions to the offered sets. This is also true when consideration sets overlap if the capacity provider is free
to independently decide what fares to offer in each market. As an example, round-trips from the US to Asia are sold both in Asia and the US. If the carrier can charge different fares depending on whether the customer buys the fare in the US or in Asia, then no further restrictions are needed. Otherwise, he needs to impose restrictions so that the same set of products is offered in both markets. One way to handle this is to post a single offer set S at a time, so then use the projection subsets S l = S ∩ N l for all markets l that are constrained to offers the same price for offered fares. Customers in market segment l select from S l and the no-purchase alternative. We will abuse notation slightly and write π lk (S l ) to denote the probability of selecting product k ∈ S l+ from market segment l. For convenience we define
The state of the system will be denoted by (t, x) where t is the time-to-go and x is an mdimensional vector representing remaining inventories. The initial state is (T, c) where T is the length of the horizon and c is the initial inventory capacity. For ease of exposition we will assume that customers arrive to market segment l as a Poisson process with time homogeneous rate λ l .
We will denote by J(t, x) the maximum expected revenues that can be obtained from state (t, x).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is given by
where ∆ lk J(t, x) = J(t, x) − J(t, x − A lk ), where A lk is the vector of resources consumed by k ∈ N l 
The Choice Based Linear Program
An upper boundJ(T, c) on the value function J(T, c) can be obtained by solving a deterministic linear program. The justification for the bound can be obtained by using approximate dynamic programming with affine functions.
We now introduce additional notation to write the linear program with value functionJ(T, c) ≥
J(T, c).
Let π l (S l ) be the n l = |N l |-dimensional vector with components π lk (S l ), k ∈ N l . Clearly π l (S l ) has zeros for all k / ∈ S l . The vector π l (S l ) gives us the probability of sale for each fare in N l per customer when we offer set S l . Let r l (S l ) = p l π l (S l ) = k∈N l p lk π lk (S l ) be the revenue rate per customer associated with offering set S l ⊂ N l where p l = (p lk ) k∈N l is the fare vector for segment l ∈ L. Notice that π l (∅) = 0 ∈ n l and r l (∅) = 0 ∈ . Let A l π l (S l ) be the consumption rate associated with offering set S l ⊂ N l where A l is a matrix with columns A lj associated with ODF j ∈ N l .
The choice based deterministic linear program (CBLP) for this model can be written as
The decision variables are α l (S l ), S l ⊂ N l , l ∈ L which represent the proportion of time that set S l ⊂ N l is used. The case of non-homogeneous arrival rates can be handled by replacing λ l T by T 0 λ ls ds. There are l∈L 2 n l decision variables. 
showed that J(T, c) ≤J(T, c)
and proposed an efficient column generation algorithm for a class of attraction models that includes the BAM. This formulation has been used and analyzed by other researchers including 
The Sales Based Linear Program for the GAM
In this section we will present a linear program that is equivalent to the CBLP for the GAM, but is much smaller in size (essentially the same size as the well known IDM) and easier to solve (as v l0
scale :
non-negativity:
Theorem 3. If each market segment π lj (S l ) is of the GAM form (2) 
thenJ(T, c) = R(T, c).
We demonstrate the equivalence of the CBLP and SBLP formulations by showing that the SBLP is a relaxation of the CBLP and then proving that the dual of the SBLP is a relaxation of the dual of the CBLP. Full details of this proof may be found in the Appendix.
The intuition behind the SBLP formulation is as follows. Our decision variables represent the amount of inventory to allocate for sales across ODFs for different market segments. The objective is to maximize revenues. Three types of constraints are required. The capacity constraints limit the sum of the allocations. The balance constraints ensure that the sale allocations are in certain hyperplanes, so when some service classes are closed for sale, the demands for the remaining open service classes (including the null alternative) changes dependently; they must be modified to offset the amount of the closed demands. The scale constraints operate on the principle that demands are rescaled depending on both the availability and the attractiveness of other items in the choice set.
The decision variables x l0 play an important role in the SBLP. Since the null alternative has positive attractiveness and is always available, the dependent demand for any service class is upper bounded based on its size relative to the null alternative. The scale constraints imply that x lk /v lk ≤ x l0 /v l0 . Therefore, the scale constraints favor a large value of x l0 . On the other hand, the balance constraint can be written as k∈Nṽ lk x lk /v lk ≤ Λ l −ṽ l0 x l0 /v l0 , favoring a small value of x l0 . The LP solves for this tradeoff taking into account the objective function and the capacity constraint. We will have more to say about x l0 in the absence of capacity constraints in Section 6.
The combination of the balance and scale constraints ensures that GAM properties are compactly represented in the optimizer and that the correct ratios are maintained between the sizes of each of the open alternatives.
For the BAM the demand balance constraint simplifies to x l0 + k∈N l x lk = Λ l . For the independent demand case,ṽ l0 = v l0 + k∈N l v lk andṽ lk = 0 for k ∈ N l . The balance constraint reduces to x l0 = (v l0 /ṽ l0 )Λ l , and the scale constraint becomes
We remark that the CBLP and therefore the SBLP can be extended to multi-stage problems since the inventory dynamics are linear. This allows for different choice models of the GAM family to be used in different periods and is the typical approach in practice.
Recovering the Solution for the CBLP
So we have learned that the SBLP problem is much easier to solve and provides the same revenue performance as the CBLP. However, there are some circumstances (described later in this section) in which it is more desirable to use the CBLP solution. The reader may wonder whether it is possible to recover the solution to the CBLP from the solution to the SBLP. In other words, is it possible to obtain a collection of offer sets {S : α(S) > 0} that solves the CBLP from the solution
The answer is yes, and the method presented here for the GAM is inspired by Topaloglu et al. (2011) who used our SBLP formulation and presented a method to recover the solution to the CBLP for the BAM. When used with the GAM, recovering the CBLP solution is important because solutions in terms of assortments tend to be more robust then solutions in terms of sales. Indeed, our experience is that when GAM parameters are estimated, Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX the solution in terms of sales can be fairly far from the solution with known parameters, whereas the solution in terms of assortments tends to be much closer.
In this section we will show how to obtain the solution of the CBLP from the SBLP and will also
show that for each market segment the offered sets are nested in the sense that there exist subsets S lk increasing in k with positive weights. The products in the smallest set are core products that are always offered. Larger sets contain additional products that are only offered part of the time.
The sorting of the products is not by revenues, but by the ratio of x lk /v lk for all k ∈ N l ∪ {0} for each l ∈ L. We then form the sets S l0 = ∅ and S lk = {1, . . . , k} for k = 1, . . . , n l , where n l = |N l | is the cardinality of N l . For k = 0, 1, . . . , n l , let
where for convenience we define x l,n l +1 /v l,n l +1 = 0. Set α l (S l ) = 0 for all S l ⊂ N l not in the collection S l0 , S l1 , . . . , S ln l . It is then easy to verify that α l (S l ) ≥ 0, that S l ⊂N l α l (S l ) = 1, and that
Applying this to the CBLP we can immediately see that all constraints are satisfied, and the objective function coincides with that of the SBLP. Notice that for each market segment the offered sets are nested S l0 ⊂ S l1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ S ln l , and that set S lk is offered for a positive fraction of time if and only if x lk /v lk > x l,k+1 /v l,k+1 . Unlike the BAM and the IDM, the sorting order of products under the GAM is not necessarily revenue ordered. This is because fares that face more competition (w lj close to v lj ) are more likely to be offered even if their corresponding fares are low.
Bounds and Numerical Examples
In this section we present two results that relate the solutions to the extreme cases w = 0 and w = v to the case 0 ≤ w ≤ v. The proofs of the propositions are in the Appendix.
The reader may wonder whether the solution that assumes w j = 0 for all j ∈ N is feasible when
The following proposition confirms and generalizes this idea. Proposition 2. Suppose that α l (S l ), S l ⊂ N l , l ∈ L is a solution to the CBLP for the GAM for
suboptimal, solution for all GAM models with w lk ∈ (w lk ,
An easy consequence of this proposition is that if α l (S l ), l ∈ L is an optimal solution for the CBLP under the BAM, then it is also a feasible, but suboptimal, solution for all GAMs with
This implies that the solution to the BAM is a lower bound on the revenue for the GAM with w k ∈ (0, v k ] for all k.
As mentioned in the introduction, the IDM underestimates demand recapture. As such optimal solutions for the SBLP under the IDM are feasible but suboptimal solutions for the GAM. The following proposition generalizes this notion.
Proposition 3. Suppose that x lk , k ∈ N l , l ∈ L is an optimal solution to the SBLP for the GAM
all GAM models with w lk ∈ [0, w lk ], k ∈ N l , l ∈ L with the same objective function value.
An immediate corollary is that if x lk , k ∈ N l , l ∈ L is an optimal solution to the SBLP under the independent demand model then it is also a feasible solution for the GAM with w k ∈ [0, v k ] with the same revenue as the IDM. This implies that the solution to the IDM is another lower bound on the GAM with w k ∈ [0, v k ] for all k.
Example 5: The following example problem was originally reported in Liu and van Ryzin (2008) .
There are three flights AB, BC and AC. All customers depart from A with destinations to either B or C. The relevant itineraries are therefore AB, ABC and AC. For each of these itineraries there are two fares (high and low) and three market segments. Market segment 1 are customers who travel to B. Market segment 2 are customers who travel to C but only at a high fare. Market segment 3 are customers who travel to C but only at the low fare. The six fares as well as v lj , j ∈ N l and v l0 for l = 1, 2, 3 are given in Table 6 . The arrivals are uniformly distributed over a horizon of T = 15, and the expected market sizes are Λ 1 = 6, Λ 2 = 9, Λ 3 = 15 and that capacity c = (10, 5, 5) for flights AB, BC and AC. In this example we will consider the parsimonious p-GAM model w lj = θv lj for all j ∈ N l , l ∈ {1, 2, 3} for values of θ ∈ [0, 1]. We will assume that the v lj values are known for all j ∈ N l , l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, but the BAM and the IDM use the extreme values θ = 0 and θ = 1, while the GAM uses the correct value of θ. This situation may arise if the model is calibrated based on sales when all products are offered, e.g., S l = N l for all l ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The objective here is to study the robustness of using the BAM and the IDM to the p-GAM for values of θ ∈ (0, 1). The situation where the parameters are calibrated from data that includes recapture will be presented in the next example.
The solution to the CBLP for the BAM is given by α({1, 2, 3}) = 60%, α({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 23.3% and α({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = 16.7% with α(S) = 0 for all other subsets of products. Equivalently, the solution spends 18, 7 and 5 units of time, respectively, offering sets {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 5} and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The solution results in $11,546.43 in revenues (see 3. in the endnotes). By Proposition 2, the solution α({1, 2, 3}) = 60%, α({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 23.3%, α({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = 16.7% is feasible for all θ ∈ (0, 1] with a lower objective function value. The corresponding SBLP solution is shown in Table 7 and provides the same revenue outcome as the CBLP. Table 7 SBLP Allocation Solution for BAM with (θ = 0)
The case θ = 1 corresponds to the IDM. The solution to the SBLP for the IDM and the corresponding revenue is given in Table 8 . By Proposition 3, the solution to the IDM is a feasible solution for all θ ∈ [0, 1) with the same objective value function. Table 6 when the true model is GAM with θ ∈ (0, 1). Notice that the BAM solution does well only for small values of θ, say θ ≤ 20% and performs poorly for large values of θ. Indeed, the BAM solution gives up about 10% of the optimal profits at the extreme value of θ = 1. The case θ = 1 corresponds to the independent demand model, and in this case the BAM anticipates demand recapture when there is none. A related finding was reported by Hartmans (2006) of Scandinavian Airlines; his simulation studies showed clear positive revenue potential of including recapture effects, but assuming strong recapture in cases where it does note exist can lead to revenue losses. The solution for the IDM gives up significant profits only for small values of θ. In particular, the IDM solution loses over 4% of the optimal profits for θ = 0 but less Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX than 0.25% of profits for θ ≥ 40%.
The optimal value function for the GAM is only marginally better than the maximum of the value functions for the BAM and the IDM. Notice that these results apply to the special case of the p-GAM, where all products in the choice set have had their shadow attractions downgraded by the same relative amount. In a more typical application, only products that face competition will have positive shadow attractions, so we expect the revenue differences between the BAM and GAM not to be as large as in Example 5. Nonetheless, the example does highlight the asymmetry of revenue performance associated with overestimating versus underestimating recapture probabilities.
Example 6: One may wonder how the three models would compare, if the attraction values in
Example 5 were estimated from data. Estimating the parameters would give the BAM and the IDM more flexibility to compensate for using the wrong value of θ. On the other hand, the burden of estimating a p-GAM as either a BAM or an IDM, can put stress on the estimated parameter.
It is not clear, therefore, whether the gaps suggested by Figure 1 are indicative of the difference in performance when the parameters need to be estimated. On the other hand, the GAM has one more parameter to estimate. What is important, therefore is to ascertain whether the GAM can result in significant improvements over the BAM and IDM, and whether the gaps are smaller or larger than those in the figure.
We tested this for three values of θ: 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. Based on Figure 1 , at θ = 0.1, we expect the BAM to do very well and the IDM to do poorly. At θ = 0.5, we expect the BAM to struggle and the IDM to do well. Finally, at θ = 0.9 we expect the BAM to do poorly and the IDM to very well.
To evaluate the performance of the three models, we generated data, estimated the parameters, solved the SBLP with the estimated parameters for each of the three models, and then evaluated, via simulation, the performance of the heuristic that uses the offer sets recommended by the SBLP.
We then compute the relative performance of the BAM and the IDM to the GAM. We report the average of the relative performance over 500 repetitions of the entire procedure.
We simulate 50 instances of demands for each of the three non-trivial subsets for each market to generate the data to estimate the parameters. For example, market 1 consists of product 3 and Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov: A General Choice Model and Network RM Optimization Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX 31 4, with non-trivial subsets {3}, {4} and {3, 4}. To estimate the parameters we used the procedure described in Section 2.4. To solve the linear program, we used the SBLP and converted the solution to the CBLP as indicated in Section 5.1. To evaluate the performance of the heuristic we simulated 1000 repetitions using the offer sets recommended by the heuristic. The implementation of the heuristic always starts by offering the largest set within a market. All the simulated requests are accepted on a first-come first-serve basis within capacity limits.
For θ = 0.1, all of the three models do a reasonably good job of estimating the attraction values.
All of the three models, agreed on offering product 3 all of the time. The GAM and the BAM agreed on offering products 1 and 2 all of the time. The IDM model, however, would some times offer product 2 by itself for short periods of time. For market 3, the BAM and the GAM, were remarkably consistent on offering product 5 by itself about 28% of the time and products 4 and 5 about 14% of the time. We were surprised by this, given the often significant differences in the estimated parameters. The IDM disagreed offered product 5 by itself about 28% of the time, but rarely offered product 4 at all. The performance of the BAM was essentially identical to the performance of the GAM, achieving close to 100% of the revenues obtained by the GAM heuristic.
The IDM model, on the other hand, yielded about 98.2% of the revenue of the GAM heuristic.
For θ = 0.5, the estimates of the parameters for both the GAM and the IDM are fairly close to the actual values. This is not so for the BAM, that makes a huge effort to accommodate for the partial recapture resulting from θ = 0.5. Table 9 illustrates the true parameters and the estimated values for the BAM, GAM, and IDM for one instance of the problem. Remarkably, even though the estimates of the parameters for the BAM are often way off, the recommendations made by the BAM were not far from those made by the GAM when viewed as solutions of the CBLP. In fact,
for the estimated values in Table 9 , the recommendations were nearly identical: Offer products 1,2 and 3 all the time. Offer product 4 and 5 together 16% of the time, and offer product 5 by itself 27% of the time. The IDM solution for the reported instance in Table 9 was consistent with the BAM and GAM for markets segments 1 and 2, but offered products 4 and 5 together 4% of the time, and product 5 by itself 34% of the time.
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX Averaging over the 500 instances, the IDM was able to capture 99.45% of the revenues of the GAM, while the BAM was able to capture 99.58%. This is contrast to Figure 1 . These experiments suggest that estimation helps the BAM relative to having the correct values of the attraction values and the wrong value of θ, but it does not help the IDM as much. Table 9 Estimates of Parameters when θ = 0.50
For θ = 0.9, the estimates of the parameters are way off for the BAM, while the estimates for the GAM and the IDM are quite close to the actual values. Nevertheless, the three models continue to agree in terms of offering products 1, 2 and 3 all the time for most instances of the problem.
For a particular instance, generated with the same seed as Table 9 , the BAM, offers products 4
and 5 together 16% of the time and offers product 5 by itself 10% of the time. The IDM, offers products 4 and 5 together 14% of the time and product 5 by itself 30% of the time. The GAM offers products 4 and 5 together 16% of the time and product 5 by itself 27% of the time. Notice that the GAM and the IDM solutions are very similar. But the BAM suffers because very little demand is recaptured from product 6 and from product 4 when only product 5 is offered. Averaging over the 500 instances, the IDM was able to capture 99.9% of the revenue relative to the GAM, while the BAM was able to capture 98.9% of the revenue relative to the GAM. In summary, with estimated parameters, the IDM and the BAM do better relative to the GAM than what would be predicted by Figure 1 when the parameters are known. Our biggest surprise was the relative modest deterioration of the BAM revenue given how far the estimates of the parameters are, in particular when θ = 0.9. To illustrate this, the estimates for the attraction values v 21 , v 22 , v 20 and Λ 2 are 0. 81, 0.38, 18.81, and 112. 14. In contrast the true values, are 10, 5, 5, and 9.
Example 7: We continue using the running example in Liu and van Ryzin but we now assume that demand is governed by the specific GAM presented in Table 10 . The model reflects positive Table 11 SBLP Allocation Solution with GAM (w > 0)
Overlapping Market Segments
Another point worth noting is that the CBLP and SBLP formulations remain equivalent even if the market segments have products that overlap. The caveat is that both formulations assume in this case that each market segment will be managed independently. This works only if the capacity provider has the ability to offer a product for a market segment without offering it to other market Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX segments. On the other hand, if a fare cannot be offered in one market without offering to other markets then both the CBLP and the SBLP formulations are upper bounds that can be tightened by adding additional constraints. This approach was used by Bront et al. (2009) for the CBLP.
They use column generation assuming that each market segment follows a BAM and show that the column generation step is NP-hard. The SBLP formulation allows for further manipulation as it is easier to add cuts that can streamline some of the computation for overlapping market segments.
In particular, Talluri (2012) has reported encouraging results using the SBLP in the context of the BAM with overlapping market segments when the number of different products for each market segment is relatively small.
Heuristics for the Stochastic Problem
The compact form of the SBLP formulation and the ease with which we can recover the solution to the CBLP from the SBLP allows for the practical developments of heuristics that call for frequent re-solving of the SBLP. For example, a bid-price heuristic can be developed by taking into account both the dual vector z corresponding to the capacity constraint as well as the dual variable β l corresponding to the balance constraint for market segment l ∈ L. Let p lk − z A lk − β lṽlk /v lk be the reduced fare for k ∈ N l . Products with positive reduced fares in the SBLP have x lk at their upper bounds of the scale constraint, which implies that they are offered 100% of the time in the CBLP. Products with x lk /v lk ∈ (0, x l0 /v l0 ) have reduced fares equal to zero. These corresponds to fares that are available only part of the time in the solution to the CBLP. Finally, products with negative reduced fares in the SBLP have x lk = 0 and are not offered at all by the CBLP. As in any bid-price heuristic, the caveat is that it may accept too many requests for products with zero reduced fares. The remedy for this, as is the case for independent demand model, is to re-solve the SBLP frequently as this gives the model an opportunity to close down such fares.
An alternative heuristic is to use the solution to the SBLP, map it into the solution of the CBLP and use the solution to the CBLP as a guide to admission control heuristics. To see how this Gallego, Ratliff, can be implemented, suppose that for a certain market the solution to the CBLP, after relabeling the products if necessary, is to offers sets {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} respectively for α({1, 2, 3}) = 0.70, α({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 0.20 and α({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) = .10 fraction of the horizon [0, T ]. It is typically advisable to offer the largest sets first, as they include the fares with zero reduced costs.
The advantage of this heuristic is that it does not over accept fares with zero reduced costs. The heuristic can also benefit from re-solving. For example, the largest sets in each market segment with α l (S lk ) > 0, l ∈ L can be offered for min l∈L α l (S lk )T units of time and at that point the SBLP can be re-solved to obtain an updated solution to the SBLP from which a new solution to the CBLP can be produced. The procedure can be repeated until the end of the horizon. Our experience is that if the SBLP is solved only once, then this heuristic can perform better than the bid-price heuristic. However, with frequent resolving, the bid-price heuristic tends to do better.
The compact form of the SBLP allows for solving the problem for random realizations of the aggregate demand as suggested in Talluri and van Ryzin (1999) . Our experience is that this refinement does better than the bid-price heuristic if the SBLP is solved infrequently. However, when the SBLP is re-solved frequently during the horizon the advantage tends to disappear and even become negative.
While the above heuristics do not anticipate randomness, they do respond to randomness when the SBLP is re-solved frequently. A number of authors have tried to incorporate randomness more directly at either the leg level or the itinerary level. Liu and van Ryzin (2008) project demands into legs and apply dynamic programming at the leg level to come up with improved heuristics. Variants of the expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) heuristic that attempt to deal with dependent demands are discussed in Weatherford and Ratliff (2010) (e.g. DAVN-MR and choice-based EMSR).
The EMSR-b MR method, proposed in Fiig et al. (2010) , see also Walczack, Mardan, and Kallesen (2010) , uses a combination of fare adjustments and a decomposition of dependent demands into independent components that allows for the use of techniques developed originally for the problem with independent demands. While computationally appealing, these methods makes very strong assumptions about the order of arrivals that are unlikely to hold in practice because the independent Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX demands obtained by the transformation cannot be directly observed and therefore cannot be adequately controlled by the output of the heuristic. The reason for this is that the independent demands obtained by the transformation consist of customers willing to buy the marginal fare and nothing else. In other words, customers willing to pay a higher fare need to wait until their fare is available and are not allowed to take advantage of the lower fares. In essence, the method works only if yieldable demand arrives before priceable demand for each fare class. In sharp contrast the choicebased EMSR heuristic of Gallego, Ratliff and Li (2009) , while a bit more onerous computationally, does almost as well as the dynamic program at the leg level because it takes into account demand dependency. We refer the reader to Gallego and Li (2012) for an explanation of the potential issues arising from using fare transformation with the independent demand decomposition suggested by Fiig et al. (2010) and Walczack, Mardan, and Kallesen (2010) .
The Assortment Problem
As a corollary to Theorem 3, the infinite capacity formulations for the SBLP and CBLP are equivalent. With infinite capacity the problem separates by market segment so it is enough to study a single market segment. To facilitate this we will drop the subscript l both in the formulation and in the analysis. The resulting problem can be interpreted as that of finding the assortment of products S ⊂ N and the corresponding sales x k , k ∈ N to maximize profits from a market segment of size D that makes decisions based on a GAM choice model. Under this interpretation the p k values are gross unit profits, net of unit costs.
The problem is similar to a bin-packing problem with constraints linking the x k 's to x 0 . An analysis of the problem reveals that the allocations should be in descending order of the ratio of order of price. Including lower priced products improves sales, but it cannibalizes demands and dilutes revenue from higher priced products. As such, the allocation of demand to products needs to balance the potential for more sales against demand cannibalization. The sorting of products for the GAM depends not only on price but on the ratio v k /ṽ k , so a low priced product with a high competitive factor θ k = w k /v k may have higher ranking than a higher priced product with a low competitive factor. To explain how to obtain an efficient allocation of demand over the different products we will assume that the products are sorted in decreasing order of p k v k /ṽ k .
Let X j = {1, . . . , j} and consider the allocation
Solving the demand constraint for x 0 we obtain
and revenue
Now consider the problem of finding the revenue R j+1 for set X j+1 = X j ∪ {j + 1}. It turns out that R j+1 can be written as a convex combination of R j and p j+1 Dv j+1 /ṽ j+1 . This implies that R j+1 > R j if and only if R j < p j+1 Dv j+1 /ṽ j+1 . Thus the consecutive set X j with highest profit has index j = max{j ≥ 1 :
The following proposition whose proof can be found in the Appendix establishes the optimality (see 4. in the endnotes) of X j .
Theorem 4. The assortment X j with j given by equation (10) is optimal.
Notice that j in equation (10) is independent of D. This means that products 1, . . . , j are offered for all demand levels D > 0 and products j + 1, . . . , n are closed regardless of the value of D.
Products j + 1, . . . , n are inefficient in the sense they do not increase sales enough to compensate for the demand they cannibalize. Table 4 illustrates precisely this fact as product 5 priced at $105
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX is inefficient because p 5 /(1 − θ 5 ) < R 4 . Notice that in this example it was better to keep product 1 at $100 fare with a competitive factor θ 1 = 0.9 than the higher product 5 at $105 with competitive factor θ 5 = 0. The intuition behind this is that closing product 5 is more likely to result in recapture than closing fare 1 (whose demand will most likely be lost to competition or to the no purchase alternative). If the problem consists of multiple market segments and each market segment is allowed to post its own available product set X lj then the problem reduces to sorting the products for market segment l in decreasing order of p lk /(1 − θ lk ), where θ lk = w lk /v lk , and then computing j(l) using (10) for each l. The resulting sets X lj(l) , l ∈ L are optimal. This has implications to Revenue Management applications where capacity is finite. When capacity is finite, the fares are reduced by the marginal value of capacity, and fares that are sub-optimal when capacity is infinite remain so when capacity is finite. This fact has been used remove inefficient fares from the SBLP by Sabre resulting in a significant savings in computations.
If a single assortment set S is to be offered to all market segments then the problem is NP-hard, see , even if there are only two market segments and the choice model is the BAM. However, the problem for the BAM is somewhat easier to analyze since the preference ordering for all the market segments is p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n whereas the preference ordering for the GAM may be different for different market segments. Assuming the order p 1 > p 2 > . . . > p n , provide a two market segment example where it is optimal to offer X 1 = {1} to market segment one, to offer X 2 = {1, 2} to market Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov: A General Choice Model and Network RM Optimization Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. XX 39 segment two and to offer X = {1, 3} to a composite of 50% of each of the two market segments.
Given the NP-hardness of the assortment problem with overlapping sets, the research activity has concentrated on bounds, heuristics and performance warranties. We refer the reader to the working papers by and Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2009) .
If prices are also decision variables, with choices reflecting price sensitivities, then the problem involves finding the offer sets and prices for each market segment. We refer the reader to Schön (2010) who allows for price discrimination, e.g., to offer different prices and offer sets to different market segments. The problem of offering a single offer set and a single vector of prices for all the market segments is again NP-hard.
Conclusions and Future Research
The general attraction model formulation is a new variation of the basic attraction model. We have
presented an E-M algorithm to estimate the parameters that is an extension and refinement of Vulcano et al. (2012) . Work is currently underway to develop techniques to estimate the parameters in situations where the arrival rates λ lt are driven by a set of covariates such as day-of-the-week, seasonality indices, and other factors that may affect demand. One known problem in applying the BAM to typical airline problems is that the IIA property can be violated in cases where there are large differences in the departure times of alternate flight services; in such cases, the recapture rates between these widely spread departures would be overestimated. This problem can be mitigated by segmenting customers by their preferred departure time.
One limitation of our model is that it provides only an upper bound when there are overlapping market segments, and only a single offer set can be posted at any given time. However, the SBLP formulation is more amenable to adding cuts and to finding polynomial time approximation algorithms to handle commonality constraints. We are currently working on these extensions for both the assortment problem and the case of finite capacities. It is also possible to extend the results in this paper to other objective functions given the equivalence of the solutions space for the CBLP .
Letting v j = π j (N ) for all j ∈ N + ,ṽ 0 = v 0 + j∈N θ j v j andṽ j = (1 − θ j )v j ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ N the choice model can be written as
, so it satisfies the GAM.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
Let N be the universe of products. The set of vendors is M = {1, . . . , m}. Let v ij be the attraction value of product i offered by vendor j, and let S j ⊂ N be the products offered by vendor j ∈ M . Let O i = {j ∈ M : i ∈ S j } be the set of vendors offering product i, and N = {i ∈ N : O i = ∅} be the collection of products that are offered. We consider a NL model where customers first select 
The conditional probability that a customer who selects nest i will buy the product from vendor j ∈ O i is given by
Consequently, the probability that a customer selects product i ∈ S j from vendor j is given by Now,
For all k ∈ N , define V − kj = max l∈O k ,l =j v kl and V kj = max l∈O k ∪{j} v kl . Then, for i ∈ S j , π i (S j ) = V ij p ij v 0 + k∈S j V kj + k∈S j V − kj , whereS j = {i ∈ N : i / ∈ S j }. The selection probability can be written as 
